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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

order directing a verdict are all cases in which it did not appear upon
the face of the verdict that it was rendered by direction of the court,
with the single exception of Holum vs. Chicago, M., and St. P. R.
11
Co.
It is apparent that the court there had no thought of overruling
Rosenthal vs. Vernon, because that case was not mentioned, although
it was decided in the same year and by the same judges who participated in the decision of Rosenthal vs. Vernon.
CARL F. ZEIDLER
Constitutional Law; Statute Taxing Foreign Corporation; Invalid
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle, Secy. of State of Washinpton, et al,
49 Sup. Ct. Rep., 204.
The Supreme Court of the United States in an opinion written by
Mr. Justice McReynolds (Justices Brandeis and Holmes dissenting)
declares statutes of the State of Washington providing that a filing fee
and a license Ice be levied on the authorized capital stock of domestic
and foreign corporations is invalid insofar as it relates to foreign corporations. The gist of the case is this:
The legislature of the State of Washington levied a tax in the nature of a filing feel and a license feel upon all corporations, both domestic and foreign, as a necessary condition to the carrying on of
business within that state. Both fhe filing and the license fees were
based upon the total amount of the authorized capital stock and were
graded upon a scale ranging from a twenty-five dollar ($25) minimum
filing fee, and a fifteen dollar ($15) minimum license fee to a maximum fee of three thousand dollars ($3,000) in both cases. The reasons
for declaring the said statutes invalid were that such fees, or taxes,
place a direct burden upon interstate commerce, and attempt to tax
property not within the jurisdiction of the state, which amounts to
a taking of property without due process of law under Art. 14, Sec. i
of the federal constitution.
In Wisconsin we have a statutory provision requiring foreign cor1)orations to pay a filing fee' and an annual license fee 4 but such fees
are levied only on the capital stock employed or to be employed in this
state.
The Washington statutes provided that the tax should be based on
the whole amount of the authorized capital stock. When it is consid"8o Wis. 299, 303;

5o N.W. 99.

Sec. 3836 Remington's Compiled Statutes of Washington.
'Sec. 3841 Id.
Sec. 226.02 subsection 4, Wis. Stat. of 1927.
'Sec. 226.02 subsection 7, Wis. Stat. of 1927.

NOTES AND COMMENT

ered that the Cudahy Company has an authorized capital stock of
$45,ooo,ooo and that less than $3o,ooo,ooo has been issued and the
total value of the corporate property was not in excess of the value
of the issued stock, it may be realized that the defendant was attempting to assess property amounting to $15,000,000 which was not even
in existence. Further examination of the affairs of the plaintiff shows
that the company did a gross business of $231,750,000 during 1926.

Of this sum, sales amounting to something more than a million dollars
were made in the state of Washington and of this sum less than half
was made in intrastate business. Therefore the defendant State attempted to levy a tax on property amounting to forty-five million
dollars of which all except approximately five hundred thousand dollars
was outside the state. True, there was a saving clause in the guise
of a maximum tax of three thousand dollars, but this is nullified by the
rule laid down in -the case of Sprout v. City of South Bends to the
effect that if the tax is a direct burden upon interstate commerce, or
levied on property without the state, the fact that it is small in amount
is immaterial.
The principle that a state may prescribe any condition it deems
suitable with which a foreign corporation must comply in return for
the privilege of carrying on its business within that state, still carries
weight. But observance of this rule cannot interfere with interstate
commerce nor conflict with the federal constitution. Loon v. Crane
Co.6 The whole case is governed by Alpha Portland Cement Co. v.
Massachusetts7 as is evidenced by the following extract quoted from
page 218 in -the report of that case: "It must now be regarded as
settled that a state may not burden interstate commerce or tax property beyond her borders under the guise of regulating or taxing intrastate business. So to burden interstate commerce is prohibited by the
Commerce Clause; and the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit
taxation of property beyond the state's jurisdiction. The amount demanded is unimportant when there is no legitimate basis for the tax."
Attention may well be directed to an interesting bit of psychology
employed by counsel for plaintiff, in alleging incorporation under the
laws of Maine. In legal theory, incorporation of plaintiff .might have
been alleged under the laws of a state contiguous to the State of Washington, or if plaintiff is not so incorporated, it is no doubt incorporated
in a state much closer to -the State of Washington than is the State
of Maine. The distance between the widely separated Maine and WashU.S. 163; 48 Sup. Ct. 502.
'245 U.S. 178, 187; 38 Sup. Ct. 85.
7268 U.S. 203; 45 Sup. Ct. 477.
Accord: State ex rel Borden Milk Co. v. Damnmann,
'277

224

N.W. 139. (Wis.)
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ington, and the fact that plaintiff corporation is decidedly not within
the confines of the latter state, nor so close as to commingle interstate
and intrastate commerce, sharply calls attention to the basic idea of
the case, i.e., interstate commerce.
THOMAS W. HAYDEN

Constitutional Law; Fourteenth Amendment; Discriminating Legislation; Classification
A state statute requiring certain associations to file a copy of their
constitution, membership oath together with a list of members, and
providing for a penalty to its members for not complying, is held not
to deny the due process clause of the United States Constitution, in a
recent case of People of State of New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman et al. Decided November 19, 1928. A state legislature may
also discriminate against a particular class from which evil sought to
be remedied is mainly to be feared. A statute requiring oath-bound associations to file their constitution, by-laws, oath, and list of its members which exempted labor unions and certain lodges, was held not
to deny equal protection as discriminating against the Ku Klux Klan,
because it is based on reasonable classification.
The relative, Bryant, who was held in custody to answer a charge
of violating this statute of New York brought a proceeding in habeas
corpus in a court of that state to obtain his discharge on the ground,
as was stated in the petition, that the warrant under which he was
arrested and detained was issued without any jurisdiction, in that the
statute which he was charged with violating was unconstitutional, because repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
which declares:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
state deprive any person, life, liberty, or property, without process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
There are various privileges and immunities which under our dual
system of government belong to citizens of the United States solely
by reason of such citizenship. It is against their abridgment by state
laws that the privilege and immunity clause in the Fourteenth Amendment is directed. But no such privilege or immunity is in question
here. If to be, and remain a member of a secret, oath-bound association
within a state be a privilege arising out of citizenship at all, it is an
incident of state rather than United States citizenship; and such protection as is thrown about it by the constitution is in no wise affected

